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ABSTRACT
The telecommunications industry is embracing Linux as a means of providing high-availability, high-reliability
systems. Realizing that proprietary systems have tremendous development and support costs, the push for
commercial-off-the-shelf solutions that provide greater than 5-Nines reliability (no more than 5 minutes of downtime/year) is a major industry focus. The carrier grade efforts encapsulate an entire ecosystem of hardware standards
for interconnection, monitoring and control as well as the software to support it. This paper examines the current
state of the art in carrier grade Linux software solutions, such as those put forth by standards organizations like the
Linux Foundation and the Service Availability Forum, and identify those standards and approaches that have
applicability in satellite systems.
themselves under schedule pressure to produce
powerful new products while needing to maintain
extremely high availability requirements1.
Like
traditional spacecraft systems, the telecommunications
industry was also a haven for proprietary operating
systems, applications software and hardware.

INTRODUCTION
Spacecraft designers are faced with significant
challenges in the management of hardware and
software faults. Hardware or software failures in space
cannot be corrected through manual intervention, so the
faults must either be tolerated or avoided. In addition,
the vagaries of space environments pose significant
hurdles for the designer.

However, in the past few years all of this has changed.
In order to keep up with performance and reliability
requirements, the industry was essentially forced to
develop standardized hardware, software interfaces and
services, and protocol stacks. Much of this effort is
focused on using enhanced, fault-tolerant versions of
the Linux operating system.

Radiation can lead to instantaneous part failure or result
in the flipping of a single bit in memory. Additionally
space debris collisions may damage spacecraft
subsystems rendering hardware non-functional. To
further complicate the design process, even though
custom-built hardware processing solutions exist to
address some of these issues, these proprietary solutions
lag their commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) counterparts
in speed and have significantly higher cost.

This paper presents a high-level design for a faulttolerant avionics system built upon Carrier Grade
Linux.
Using standard CGL fault detection and
handling services, designers can examine the use of
previously unconsidered low mass and very power
efficient COTS equipment for space applications. Such
an avionics system may provide a cost-effective
alternative to radiation-hardened computers for LEO

Carrier Grade Linux (CGL) grew out of an effort in the
telecommunications industry where vendors found
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missions.
CARRIER GRADE LINUX BACKGROUND
The computing industry has embraced the concept of
deploying multiple computing nodes tightly coupled
together with high-bandwidth interconnectivity as a
means of achieving both greater aggregate processing
power and increased availability. In CGL, these tightly
coupled nodes are known as clusters. A cluster can be
used to achieve a variety of goals; high performance
computing, high data throughput, or high availability
services.
An entire hardware and software
infrastructure has been built around the definition,
implementation, and use of these clusters.

Figure 1: Logical Elements of an ATCA Shelf.
Source PICMG2.

From a hardware perspective, the PCI Manufacturing
Group (PICMG) develops and promotes standards for
telecom equipment manufacturers.
In the
telecommunications industry, single board computers
(SBCs) are now built to standardized form factors with
standard power and thermal requirements. One such
standard for SBCs is the Advanced Mezzanine Card
module or AdvancedMC module.

The Carrier Grade functionality is provided at a system
level by the Shelf Manager boards while the blade
boards are typically used to provide the payload
applications. As the Shelf Manager would otherwise be
a single point of failure, a backup shelf manager exists.
All of this hardware does a tremendous job for
providing highly reliable terrestrial systems.
Unfortunately, the ATCA standard itself is not terribly
amenable to use in spacecraft. ATCA is typically a 9U
form factor – too large for use in small satellite
platforms. And, although microTCA is a 3U form
factor, both standards are predicated on using the
standard telecommunications 48V DC power supplies.
Again, this power draw is not well suited for space
applications.

One or more of these modules are meant to be plugged
into a carrier board and then inserted into a
standardized chassis.
This approach effectively
amounts to using computer “lego blocks” to assemble a
semi-custom “blade server” from standardized
components. If an approach such as this could be
employed in satellite systems, we would have the
possibility of begin able to construct the major
computing components of the spacecraft in a matter of
days rather than months.

Nonetheless, as satellite designers, we can take some of
the lessons learned in this reliable hardware technology
and design spacecraft that leverages these concepts.
For example, the backplane of an ATCA chassis is not
really a bus per se. In fact, the backplane is actually a
collection of high-speed Ethernet segments so the
ATCA chassis logically looks like a multi-node
network rather than a computer with a bus. The
standard ATCA interconnect strategy could be replaced
with proven satellite technology such as SpaceWire
links. This new backplane could then become a
standard for use in spacecraft systems.

The standard chassis for these blade servers is the
Advanced Telecom Computing Architecture (ATCA)
and the microTCA form factors. These chassis are built
with remote monitoring in mind and are equipped with
sensors (interconnected via an I2C bus) to track the
state of the power rails, temperature in the chassis and
the current health and status of blade servers in the
various slots. In CGL terms, each AdvancedMC SBC
is a node, and the entire ATCA chassis is a cluster or
shelf. The logical structure of an ATCA shelf is shown
in Figure 1.
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Standardized hardware is of little use without
standardized software to make it function.
A
considerable amount of thought, time and effort was
applied to developing the necessary command and
control software for controlling potentially thousands of
compute nodes in remote central offices. Standards
organizations such as the Service Availability Forum
have defined the Hardware Platform Interface (HPI)
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and Application Interface Specification (AIS)
accordingly to meet the clustering requirements for
carrier-grade systems.
HPI provides a common
interface to CG health and status hardware. And, AIS
provides a set of high availability (HA) services to be
accessed and configured by HA applications.

Definition. CGL incorporates the Linux operating
system with carrier grade enhancements. The CGL
requirements encompass the AIS and HPI standards put
forth by the SA Forum. CGL requirements include
serviceability, availability, security, clustering, and
performance specifications. All of these requirements
have their analogs in the spacecraft design business.

Hardware vendors have responded by providing HPI
implementations with their platforms.
For those
platforms whose vendors have not developed HPI
implementations, the open-source OpenHPI reference
implementation can be used or customized. Likewise,
OpenAIS provides an open-source, production-quality
implementation of the AIS specification.
By
developing against the AIS and HPI standards,
applications are portable across a variety of hardware
platforms.
Figure 2 below from the Service
Availability Forum illustrates the layers of the carrier
grade infrastructure.

THE
CHALLENGES
OF
SPACECRAFT
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
Two components drive the complexity of spacecraft
software development: the prevalent use of custom
hardware (due to power, mass, and form factor
concerns) and high radiation environments which
impact the OS and application software.
Custom Hardware and Software
Although spacecraft are frequently one-off systems
built around custom hardware, the basic systems are
typically quite similar. For example, most spacecraft
implement some form of command and data handling
subsystem around a particular distributed messaging
API. Aerospace companies often develop in-house
APIs and solutions for such functionality, but due to
their proprietary nature, the implementation cannot
compare to industry-wide standards. The use and
deployment of systems based on open standards, such
as CGL, means a significant amount of software reuse
is possible between satellite programs even with
different boards and interconnects.
Radiation Effects
Spacecraft software development is affected by two
aspects of the radiation environment: Total Ionizing
Dose (TID) and Single Event Effects (SEE). TID is a
measurement of the total amount of energy absorbed
over time by a device. Using the total dose tolerance of
the spacecraft components and the expected radiation
environment, the spacecraft designer can estimate the
lifetime of components in orbit.
Radiation-hardened processors typically have a much
higher total dose tolerance than COTS processors.
However, for altitudes below 1400km, COTS
processors are sufficiently tolerant for a 15 year
mission4. Shielding is also effective as a means to
increase the total dose tolerance. For the remainder of
this paper, radiation discussions will focus on SEE
effects.

Figure 2: SA Forum Application Interface
Specifications3

Conversely, an SEE is an event produced by a single
highly charged particle. The most common form of
SEE is known as the SEU (Single Event Upset). The
SEU most often goes unnoticed but may produce soft-

The Open Software Development Laboratory (OSDL),
now part of the Linux Foundation, develops and
maintains the Carrier Grade Linux Requirements
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failures. Avoidance and/or tolerance of radiation
effects are among the most difficult challenges faced by
a spacecraft software team.

Table 1: SAForum AIS Core Services
Service

Functions

Space
Applicability

Effects of radiation on COTS and radiation-hardened
boards
A typical PowerPC 750FX single board computer
operates at 800MHz and can contain up to 1GB of
RAM. But the processor is quite susceptible to
radiation caused upsets. The COTS PowerPC 750FX
processor is rated to expect 34 uncorrected errors per
year at the solar minimum Galactic Cosmic Ray
background rate and 320 upsets per flare for the JPL
Design Case Flare5.

Availability
Management
Framework
(AMF)

Fault detection, fault
recovery, cluster
coordination

Cluster
Management
Service (CLM)

Infrastructure, PublishSubscribe – Node joins
Yes
cluster, node leaves
cluster

Radiation faults may be avoided by using radiation
hardened components. Radiation hardening isolates
electronic components in order to completely prevent
latchup conditions (Single Event Latchup, or SEL) and
reduces the probability of an SEU6.
A radiationhardened variant of the PowerPC 750 processor powers
the RAD750 single board computer. The RAD750
executes at clock speeds of 133 MHz – 166 MHz and
contains 128MB of EDAC RAM. The advertised SEU
rate for the card is less than 1 error in 250 years7.

Checkpoint
(CKPT)

Assists with fault
recovery – reduce
downtime

Yes

Event (EVT)

Infrastructure, PublishSubscribe state
changes

Possibly

Lock (LCK)

Infrastructure, Shared
resource control

Possibly

Messaging
(MSG)

Infrastructure, Internode, Intra-node
messaging

Possibly

Information
Model
Management
Service (IMMS)

Standard model of
cluster entities

No

Logging (LOG)

Infrastructure

Possibly

Notification
(NTF)

Infrastructure, failure
notification to external
entities

Possibly

Because of the low error rate of a radiation hardened
processor, the application developer may not be
required to consider radiation effects within his or her
software design and implementation. However, the use
of radiation hardened processors carries significant
drawbacks including lead-time, cost, and performance.
Fault Tolerance
A fault tolerant system assumes that faults within
individual components will occur but is designed to
detect and handle such faults to ensure overall mission
success. The key concept with fault tolerance is the use
of redundancy to detect and correct faults. Here we
will look at the role CGL can play in a redundant
system to assure overall mission success.
CARRIER GRADE LINUX SERVICES FOR
SPACECRAFT
Carrier Grade Linux provides, through the SAForum’s
AIS and HPI standards, a suite of services that can
assist in the development of robust spacecraft software
systems. The AIS core level services are listed below
in Table 1.
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Availability Management
The Availability Management Framework (AMF)
provides services and coordination to the entire
membership of a cluster. It enables high availability by
monitoring and detecting the health and readiness of
redundant resources in the cluster.
AMF provides a variety of means for the determination
of a failed node. These means include internal
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monitoring, external monitoring, and passive
monitoring. Internal monitoring uses some application
state to determine if the processor has failed. In
external monitoring, an application does nothing toward
monitoring, but its interaction with other entities or
resources is monitored. An example of external
monitoring would be link-level or application-level
communication checks between neighbor nodes.
Finally, passive monitoring is similar to a processor
watchdog using features of the operating system to
indicate “aliveness” of a process.

service enables applications to record dynamic state
information.
If, at anytime, a system, node, or
application fault is detected, the system, node, or
application may be reset and resume operation from a
saved checkpoint. Checkpoint data may be replicated
across multiple nodes for reliability. Performance of a
checkpoint solution is crucial for many applications
where it would be unacceptable to read application state
from disk or flash with every usage. The performance
specification for Carrier Grade Linux specifies
checkpoint operations sustain 500 writes per second
and 500 reads per second of 2kB blocks12.

With the cluster-wide knowledge of each node state, the
AMF is responsible for coordinating and providing
automatic failover for failed nodes in the system. In
addition, the AMF is responsible for protecting the
system and system resources from a failed node. Once
node failure has been detected, Carrier Grade Linux
requires that the failed node is unable to access or
corrupt shared resources12. For an example of why this
additional requirement is necessary, consider the
condition where a node has stopped responding to a
ping request. This failure is not necessarily caused by a
halting failure of the failed node. If the failed node
simply lacked the available processor cycles to respond,
the node could wake up eventually and write old data to
shared system resources. This action could corrupt the
system resource. Instead AMF generally prevents such
corruption by resetting the errant node. This technique
9
is generally known as Node Fencing .

Events and Sensor Data Alarms
Carrier Grade Linux provides an Event Service (EVT)
and a Notification Service (NTF). The EVT service
provides a publish-and-subscribe API to communicate
events throughout the cluster. The Notification Service
is similar but is intended to pass data to systems
external to the cluster10. Flight software applications
have a need to push events to a set of listeners. Events
may include items such as mere state change “Image
Captured” or items of high criticality - “Payload Input
Current High”. For the former event, a listener may
exist simply to schedule the next image. For the latter
event, there might be three listeners. The first listener
might take immediate action to open the relay
controlling the payload. The second listener would
record the data into long-term storage for eventual
consumption by the ground station. The third listener
would send the data to the ground immediately.

Cluster Membership
The Cluster Membership Service (CLM) maintains and
reports the list of nodes in the system. The list is
updated anytime a node is added to or removed from
the system. Any application may subscribe to CLM
services to determine the active nodes in the cluster.

Messaging
Spacecraft application developers usually develop APIs
to provide messaging services between distributed
nodes. Carrier Grade Linux provides a messaging
service (MSG) out of the box including sophisticated
features such as multicast and persistence. Multicast is
implemented over named message queues. Using a
named message queue means that communicating
applications do not require explicit knowledge of the
node that will perform the requested function. This is
an important feature in supporting automatic failover.

In addition to providing the backbone for many of the
AIS Core services, CLM provides the information
necessary to operate many other application layer
services. Services and callback functions are available
for redundant systems to manage the use of primary and
backup nodes and services. Consider the handling of a
load shedding algorithm. Low power conditions may
require redundant nodes or entire systems to be taken
offline. Using CLM, all applications affected by the
loss of a node will be made aware of that loss, and can
act (or not act) accordingly.

Beyond the capabilities of many trivial message queue
implementations, the message queues in CGL may be
persistent. With a persistent message queue, reboots or
other unexpected events can be handled and the
message sequence preserved. The value of a persistent
message queue is in the handling of a sequence of
related messages. Loss of a single message within the
series of messages invalidates the entire series.

Checkpoint and Recovery
Carrier Grade Linux provides reliable and fast
checkpointing services.
The checkpoint (CKPT)
Scharpf
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Lock Service
CGL’s Lock Service (LCK) provides node level
mutex’s for the protection and synchronization of
resources within a cluster.
This service enables
consistent access to data across all nodes in a system by
enabling atomic access to the resource. In a redundant
system with multiple means of accessing an actuator,
sensor, or other system resource, it is necessary to
manage that access to prevent corruption of commands,
control, or data.

lasting computational effects coupled with the tight
timing requirements drive the need for active
processor redundancy.
Sensor Data Collection and Manipulation refers
to the reading of avionics sensors, prepare and
transform the raw data for higher level usage, and
placing the data into long-term storage. A wide
variety of sensors exist for satellite avionics. Each
has different requirements for availability and
redundancy. Some sensors will need redundant
connections, for some it will be advantageous to
have redundant sensors, and finally, some may not
require redundancy at all. An avionics temperature
sensor will probably not have high availability
requirements nor will redundancy be required
although it would be simple to achieve. At the
other extreme, availability of data is critical for a
GPS or star tracker while sensor redundancy is
often unrealistic.
In this case, the system can
provide redundant connectivity to the sensor so that
if the primary processor is unavailable the backup
processor can seamlessly takes its place.

Resource Monitoring
Carrier Grade Linux provides a number features for
monitoring resources. High-low watermark thresholds,
alarms, and “leaky buckets” are among the many
methods offerred11.
The leaky bucket resource monitoring filter is worth
mentioning. The leaky bucket algorithm is a method of
implementing hysteresis in a system to stabilize its
response to spurious errors. Bad readings from sensors
occur infrequently and it is undesirable for on-board
countermeasures to take action or otherwise report
failure from a bad reading. A counter may be used to
store the number of occurrences of a “failed” reading
from the sensor. A threshold is set on the counter rather
than the sensor reading and when that threshold has
exceeded, fault handling actions occur. Meanwhile, the
counter is slowly decremented in order to prevent rare
failed sensor readings from tripping the threshold8.

Actuator Control refers to such activities as
closing and opening electrical relays that power
various resources and subsystems. Frequently,
higher-level logic pulls together sensor data with
the expected state according to the actuator
manipulation to determine if an error has occurred.
At least one processor board must have an I/O
interface to a given actuator. In order to tolerate
failures, a second processor board must have an I/O
interface to mission critical actuators. However, in
some instances, it may be dangerous to issue the
same command twice.

AVIONICS DESIGN USING CARRIER GRADE
LINUX
The design put forth here assumes the use of COTS
single board computers used in a redundant
configuration to provide the services and systems
needed for a satellite avionics system.

Command and Data Handling refers to the
storage and execution of ground commands and the
long-term storage of spacecraft telemetry. C&DH
has large memory requirements but low processing
requirements. Commands may be intended for
sensors or actuators or other processors. The need
for issuing commands to other processors
necessitates
the
need
for
redundant
interconnections between nodes. The long-term
storage necessitates a high degree of fault tolerance
within the data.

Among the primary components of a flight avionics
system are sensor data collection and manipulation,
actuator control, control algorithms, and command and
data handling. Each of these components has different
availability and processing requirements. Below, we
discuss each these components and their needs in a
redundant system to meet system design requirements.
Avionics Control Algorithms refer to the control
algorithms used for such systems as solar arrays
and attitude control. Avionics control algorithms
tend to be synchronous and have tight timing
requirements but require small amounts of
memory. Faults within these algorithms may have
lasting effects on computational results. The
Scharpf
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These functional requirements may be notionally met
with a four processor-board system with redundant I/O
and a redundant inter-processor communications fabric.
An example system is shown in Figure 3.

significant risk of data corruption between the data
write and the data read. For reference, assume 1kB data
blocks, 10E-5 errors/bit-day data corruption rate, and
12-hour data storage. For this example, radiation
corrupts one in twenty-five data blocks within the flight
memory bank. The high error rate necessitates the
usage of EDAC.
Error Detection and Correction is a means to both
identify when data integrity is lost (detection) and
recover the original data (correction). Data is stored
with redundant bits (encoded). A common encoding
technique is the Hamming Code. The Hamming Code
is able to detect and correct single bit errors and detect
double-bit errors.

Figure 3: Redundant Avionics System
Nodes A0 and A1 demonstrate connections to
redundant sensors X and X' and non-redundant sensors
Y and Z. Nodes B0 and B1 demonstrate redundant
connectivity to a single actuator. All four nodes are
connected to two redundant communications fabrics.
To provide high availability for the system, the nodes
work as service pairs. While software processes can
generally be executed on any of the nodes, hardware
access to sensors and actuators is physically limited by
the system design. Nodes B0 and B1 form a service
pair for the illustrated actuator. Nodes A0 and A1 form
a service pair for Sensor X and X’. The following
discussion illustrates the fault tolerance techniques used
in this design and how CGL enables their usage.
Detecting Radiation Events
Given that this design assumes that radiation effects
will cause SEUs on a somewhat regular basis, the first
step in recovery is detection of the error.
The Availability Management Framework (AMF)
described earlier provides basic high-level detection of
system faults. Using heartbeats and other means, this
service can detect the baseline health of a node in the
system. This service will also be the means by which
other faults in the system can be registered with CGL so
that recovery can take place.
Software EDAC
For stored commands and satellite telemetry, there is
Scharpf

Current research indicates that multiple-bit errors occur
at a rate approximately 10% of the rate at which singlebit failures occur13. Furthermore, the general guidance
is that the prevalence of multiple-bit errors increases as
device sizes continue to shrink7. This fact tends to be
the primary reason for the use of low density memory
on spacecraft systems today.
Returning to the avionics design example, the design
deploys a software EDAC algorithm. While reading
and writing commands and telemetry from the longterm data bank, software EDAC is used to detect and
correct single bit errors. For multiple bit errors, the
node may register the fault with the system and be
reset.
In addition, an EDAC “scrubbing” process running in
the background provides a continuous sweep through
registered memory (whether program or data) and can
clean up any single bit errors, and detect multiple bit
errors.
Data Handling
Sensor data collection and manipulation requires an
application to read raw data from a variety of sensors,
process and place the data into long-term storage, and
forward the data to any requesters.
It is usually important for spacecraft applications to
deploy monitors of sensor data. These monitors
generate both a custom corrective action and place an
event in long-term storage to indicate the failure and the
action taken. CGL supports monitors in two ways.
First, CGL allows the designation of trivial thresholds
associated with the raw or derived data. Threshold
failures generate notifications placed in long-term
storage.
As these notifications support multiple
7
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listeners, a secondary listener may exist to take
corrective action upon the notification.
A second important way in which CGL assists with
data handling is hysteresis.
Raw data reads from
sensors are notoriously noisy. CGL supports the
designation of a leaky bucket algorithm where singleevent errors during data reads do not affect the failure
trend. The developer defines high and low water marks
for the bucket and transitions past these thresholds
generate failure notifications.
N-Modular Redundancy
N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) may be used to further
detect faulty operations. Most implementations of these
voting algorithms require specialized hardware.
However, for Carrier Grade Linux, the only
requirement is a high bandwidth interconnect. The
existing Carrier Grade services provide the base
platform for such an implementation.

Figure 4: Illustration of NMR using CGL Services
Fault Recovery
Fault recovery clears the fault on the failed node and
enables continuous operation through the reallocation
of system resources. In order to clear the fault, the
failed node is typically reset. Spare nodes are
reallocated to perform the functions originally allocated
to the failed node. The spare nodes read the current
application state from a checkpoint for rapid recovery.

To see how NMR may be implemented over Carrier
Grade Linux, consider the use of multipoint-tomultipoint communications through message groups.
The vote occurs in one message group while the
calculation occurs in the second message group. The
group to evaluate the votes consists of an active node
and a passive spare node. Meanwhile, the group that
performs the calculation consists of three or more active
nodes. The message containing the input data is sent
into the calculation group. When each node has
completed the calculation, the message is sent into the
vote evaluation group. The votes are counted and
disagreement results in an event notification (see the
Notification service in Table 1) that a particular node
has failed. The Availability Management Framework
handles the node failure event by restarting the failed
node from the most recent checkpoint. A model of this
prospective solution is illustrated in Figure 4.

Fault clearance
CGL supports different means to clear a fault. These
means include trivial restart of a task to a reboot or
power-cycle of the failed node. The developer may use
CGL’s resource monitoring techniques of counters and
leaky buckets to define escalating fault clearance
methods.
Sparing
Though N-Modular Redundancy requires an odd
number of nodes, our system design must allow for the
reset of any one of the active nodes at anytime. In
order to provide seamless availability to all sensors and
actuator interfaces, the “spare” fourth processor must be
kept on-line for immediate failover should its service
partner get reset.
Referring to Figure 3 above, nodes B0 and B1 provide
access to an actuator. Consider the state where A0, A1
and B1 are active nodes and B0 is a spare. If fault is
detected on active node B1 and the node requires a
reset, the actuator would be unavailable while B1 is
brought back online. However, because B0 exists as a
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hot-spare, the actuator interface remains seamlessly
available.
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In addition to the processors defined, it is possible to
add further redundancy to the system with additional
cold spares. Cold spares in a design can be used to
address total dose radiation concerns. In particular, a
powered off electronic device is less susceptible to
ionizing radiation and will be available in the event an
active device fails.
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(Integrated Spacecraft Computer) Case Study of a
Proven Viable Approach to Using COTS in Spaceborne
Computer Systems", 14th Annual/USU Conference on
Small Satellites, 2000.

Recovery
Beyond the reset of the failed node, CGL coordinates
resource reallocation and checkpoint recovery.
Reference the hardware layout in Figure 3; assume a
failure of node B0. B0 and B1 provide the same
service, actuator control, so CGL assigns B1 to perform
actuator control. Meanwhile, CGL notifies the cluster
that B0 is no longer a member of the cluster. In order
for B1 to assume B0’s functionality with zero
downtime, B1 reads B0’s application state from CGL’s
replicated checkpoint.
Note that the design has redundant high-bandwidth
interconnects.
CGL system software supports
redundant interconnections directly. Therefore, even a
double-failure where B0 fails and B1’s primary
network connection fails does not lead to downtime.
With the low downtime provided by native CGL
services, an avionics system built upon redundancy
become practical.

5. Hillman, Robert, Conrad, Mark, Layton, Phil,
Thibodaeu, Chad, “Space Processor Radiation
Mitigation and Validation Techniques for an 1800
MIPS Processor Board”, 7th European Conference on
Radiation and its Effects on Components and Systems
(RADECS) 2003.
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June
2006
from
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CONCLUSION
The level of services provided by Carrier Grade Linux
enables the usage of advanced spacecraft fault tolerance
techniques with little effort required by the application
developer.
Fault tolerance techniques such as
checkpoint and recovery and data replication are
available out of the box.
Additional supporting
infrastructures for messaging and event notifications
provide useful standards-based functionality that may
replace proprietary infrastructure designs. This paper
has described how the services provided by CGL apply
to spacecraft environments. Using these services, we
have described a hypothetical cluster as a low-cost,
high-availability spacecraft avionics solution.
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